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Abstract
This study uses the observed di¤erences between public system failures and private investment as a
natural experiment to reveal the e¤ect of nancing constraints on rmsability to substitute specically for
decient public services and more generally to acquired complementary capital. The analysis of the rm-level
data from Sub-Saharan Africa shows that, controlling for other factors, rms with a better access to credit
are also more likely to invest into private substitutes when public services are decient. Consistent with
the predictions of the theoretical model these ndings indicate that nancing constraints have a signicant
impact on rmsability to deal with poor public capital.
JEL Classication: D92, H54, O16.
Keywords: Financing Constraints, Complementary Capital, Natural Experiment, Sub-Saharan Africa
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1 Introduction
Financing constraints is an important research subject in the economic literature, which attempts to explain
why rms do not undertake prot-maximizing investment, i.e. why they do not expand their capital stock if
marginal return to capital is above the market interest rate.1 Credit constraints now gure prominently in
macroeconomic analysis, and there is a strong evidence from cross-country regressions that underdeveloped
nancial systems are associated with poor investment and growth.2 The microeconomic evidence, especially
from the developing country data, remains limited. Establishing evidence of credit constraints from micro-
economic data is di¢ cult, because measuring the return to capital is complicated by unobserved factors such
as entrepreneurial ability and demand shocks, which are likely to be correlated with capital stock.
This study uses the observed di¤erences between public system failure and private investment as a
natural experiment to reveal the e¤ect of nancing constraints on rmsability to substitute specically for
decient public services and more generally to acquired complementary capital. The complementary capital
is dened as as capital that provides support services necessary for the operation of productive private capital
(e.g., transport infrastructure, such as roads, ports, and railways; or utilities, such as electricity, water, and
telephone).3 Abundant complementary capital improves rmsproductivity and is essential for economic
growth.4
Frequent disruptions in infrastructure generate excess demand for complementary capital by rms and
households in most developing countries.5 On the other hand, increasing the supply of complementary
capital remains a di¢ cult task. The public sector, the largest contributor to the nancing of infrastructure
is constrained by the scal adjustment programs, and decentralization resulting in mismatches between
resources and needs. O¢ cial development assistance (ODA), traditionally the second largest source of
infrastructure nancing, started to decline in the 1990s with the greater hope for a large private sector
contribution. The private sector contributions to complementary capital nancing have been growing, but
its success is hampered by the cost of doing business in developing countries, which has been much higher
than expected.6
Given these di¢ culties in increasing the supply of complementary capital, how can the private sector
cope with this problem? Reinikka and Svensson (2002) have shown that rms can partially mitigate the
problem and substitute for decient public services by investing in complementary capital themselves.7 The
1See Hubbard (1998).
2See e.g. King and Levine (1993), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Beck, Levine and Loayaza (2000).
3Reinikka and Svensson (2002, p. 53)
4See Calderon and Serven (2004), and Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier, and Mengistae (2005).
5See Briceno-Garmendia, Estache, and Shak (2004) for rough estimates of desired and actual investment in complementary
capital.
6Estache (2004, p.9)
7The conclusions of Reinikka and Svensson (2002) are based from the microeconomic evidence on the quality of power
supply from public grid and private investment in electric power generators in Uganda. Foster and Steinbuks (2007) provide
more general evidence from the regression analysis on 24 African countries, which demonstrates that though power outages are
signicant in explaining rmsgenerator ownership.
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loss to the economy is the di¤erence between the marginal gains to public and private complementary capital.
An important implication of this nding is that larger adverse supply shocks to complementary capital are
associated with larger demand for private investment in complementary capital.
Supply shocks to complementary capital are typically uncorrelated with rmsentrepreneurial ability.
This is because poor infrastructure, including power shortages, bad roads, inadequate water and sanitation,
and unreliable communications is the outcome of public policies not rmsdecisions. This study exploits
these exogenous shocks to identify the e¤ect of nancing constraints on rmsinvestment in complementary
capital.
The analysis focuses on the natural experiment created by the rms decision to invest in electric power
generator. First, a theoretical model is developed to derive prot maximizing conditions of a risk-neutral rm
choosing whether to acquire a private generator to hedge against unreliable public power supply. The model
predicts that nancing constraints will reduce rms expected return from the generator. Thus, holding
other things constant, rms with better access to credit will be more likely to install the generator if the
power outages are frequent.
The predictions of the theoretical model are then tested empirically on rm-level data from Sub-Saharan
African countries. Endogenous switching regression and the di¤erence-in-di¤erences methods are used to
obtain consistent estimates and overcome the measurement and the identication problems. The results
show that rms with better access to credit are more likely to own a private generator in the areas where
public power supply is unreliable. Also, the rms are more likely to respond to the power outage shocks and
privately install generators if they operate in the countries with more developed nancial systems or during
the periods of rapid domestic credit growth. Consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model, these
ndings suggest that nancing constraints can signicantly restrain rmsability to nd a replacement for
a decient public capital.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. The rst section reviews the existing literature. The second
section presents a theoretical model, which attempts to explain the impact of nancing constraints on rms
choice of electric generator. The third and fourth sections discuss data and stochastic specication. The fth
section presents ndings based on the analysis of the World Bank enterprise survey data. The last section
outlines main conclusions of this study.
2 Literature Review
The inuence of credit constraints on manufacturing rms is evident based on economic theory8 and has been
linked in the empirical literature to economic development.9 Many theoretical models incorporate nancing
8For a detailed survey, see Hubbard (1998)
9See King and Levine (1993), and Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Beck, Levine and Loayaza (2000).
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constraints based on information problems (adverse selection and moral hazard).10 Other theoretical models
explore nancial constraints in the context of enforcementproblems (e.g. ability to seize collateral).11 More
recent theoretical papers12 also view nancing constraints from the perspective of the literature on industry
dynamics.
The central challenge in the empirical work on nancing constraints is to estimate consistently their
e¤ects on rmsperformance indicators, such as growth, output, returns to capital, and investment. This
task appears to be complicated. First, a rms nancing constraints are di¢ cult to measure, especially
in the context of unreliable developing country data. Second, both nancing constraints and performance
indicators are likely to be correlated with entrepreneurial ability, which is typically unobservable to the
econometrician. As a result, omitted variables bias will render ordinary least squares regression estimates
biased and inconsistent. The empirical literature provides several approaches to address these challenges.
The rst approach, suggested by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) relies on Tobins q theory of
investment and tests for the sensitivity of rm investment to cash ows.13 The intuition of this approach is
as follows. Modigliani and Miller (1958) have shown that, in perfect nancial markets, a rms investment
should only respond to its investment growth opportunities (measured by marginal Tobins q). Indicators
of the availability of internal funds, such as cash ow, should not a¤ect the rms investment. Therefore, a
signicant coe¢ cient on the measure of the cash ow in an investment equation may indicate the presence
of nancial market imperfections.
Because cash ow may be correlated with investment for other reasons, for example it may predict future
protability14 , Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) implement cash ow tests separately for rms that
are likely to be more constrained and rms that are likely to be less constrained.15 Their results show
large and signicant positive coe¢ cients on cash ows coe¢ cients for for rms that are likely to be more
constrained, and interpret this nding as an evidence of nancing constraints. More recent applications of
the cash ows test rely on simulation based econometrics. Instead of estimating reduced form investment
equations, this method develops and calibrates a dynamic model of rm-level investment and then estimates
it using econometric simulation techniques.16 The recent examples of this approach include Alti (2003),
Moyen (2004), Bond and Soderbom (2006), and Schundeln (2007).
The key criticisms of cash-ow tests are that the proposed solution to estimate separate models for di¤er-
ent classes of rms does not resolve endogeneity between cash-ows and investment, and that the investment
10These models follow Ja¤e and Russell (1976), and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). For a survey of application of these models in
the development economics literature, see Banerjee (2001).
11See e.g. Aghion and Bolton (1992), and Hart and Moore (1994, 1998).
12Gomes (2001), Quadrini (2003), Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006).
13A close alternative to this approach suggested by Bond and Meghir (1994) is based on Euler equations.
14See Schiantarelli (1996)
15The economic literature suggests di¤erent criteria to sort out rms into "more constrained" and "less constrained" categories.
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) group rms according to their deposit retention ratios. Nabi (1989) distinguishes between
rms, which borrow in formal and informal markets. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) propose an index of nancing constraints
based on the predictions from an ordered logit regression.
16For a survey of simulation based econometric methods see Gourieroux and Monfort (1996).
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equations based on Tobins q theory of investment are not valid if Modigliani and Miller (1958) assumptions
are not satised.17 For the investment equations based approach, it is di¢ cult to obtain measures of average
q and cash ows, in particular in the context of developing countries, because market value of the rm is
not observed.18 Also, the accounting information provided by the rms in developing countries (especially
small and microenterprises) is subject to serious measurement errors.19 Due to these errors the average q
might be a poor proxy for marginal q, which is usually unobserved.20 This test also requires su¢ ciently long
data panels, which are typically unavailable.21 As regards simulation based econometric methods, although
they allow researchers to estimate very rich models of rm behavior, they still face similar identication and
measurements problems, which make them very di¢ cult to apply on developing country data.22
The second approach looks at direct evidence for constraints by analyzing survey data. For example,
Bigsten, Collier, Dercon et al (2003) estimate the determinants of demand for external formal funds (i.e.
bank loans) in Sub-Saharan Africa explicitly using a selection model. Their results suggest that access
to nance is greater for larger and more protable rms. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005)
assess the importance of nancing obstacles, using survey evidence on each rms ordinal ratings on how
problematic specic nancing issues are for the operation and growth of their business.
The limitation of the analysis based on the survey data is that it relies on strong assumptions about the
relationship between a rms perceptions and its true credit demand. For example, a rm that does not
apply for a bank loan because "the interest rate is too high" may be constrained or simply unproductive
relative to the prevailing market interest rate. Firms perceptions are also subject to serious measurement
errors. For example, strongly negative assessment of nancing constraints can reect the complaints of overly
pessimistic managers, not the true nancial position of the rm.23
The approach undertaken in this paper is related to studies that use the stock market, nancial interme-
diaries, or enterprise survey data to nd randomized evaluations24 and natural experiments25 that directly
17See also the debate about whether this method is valid in Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) and Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen (2000). Cooper and Ejarque (2003) demonstrate that in standard Q-regressions the coe¢ cient on cash ow can be
positive, although there are no capital market imperfections, if rms have market power as sellers. Strebulaev (2007) shows
that the tests of capital structure may fail if rmscapital adjustments are infrequent.
18Rajan and Zingales (1998) attempt to overcome this problem by using U.S. rm information and assuming that the
behaviour of the rms in other countries is similar to that of the U.S. rms in the same industry.
19See de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodru¤ (2007a).
20Erickson and Whited (2000) attempt to remedy this problem by constructing appropriate Generalized Method of Moments
estimator.
21This is especially important for Euler equations approach (see footnote 13). Love (2003) implemented the Euler equations
based approach on the developing country data, and showed that the sensitivity of investment to cash ow depends negatively
on nancial development.
22Schundeln (2007) attempts to resolve endogeneity between cash-ows and investment by simultaneously modeling the real
side and the nancial side of the rm, in a manner that allows identication of investment opportunities of a rm separately
from determinants of the cost of credit, which is unobserved in the data, and alternative reasons for low investment that are
common to all rms, as for example adjustment costs.
23Love and Mylenko (2003) attempt to solve this problem, by controlling for each managers general perceptions of other
(non-nancial) constraints. They argue that a manager who answers most of questions on any type of constraint negatively
will be more likely to report major nancing constraints.
24For a survey of randomization methods in the development economics, see Duo, Glennerster, and Kremer (2007).
25For a survey of natural experiments in economics, see Meyer (1995). Though well known before, their widespread use is
frequently attributed to a series of inuential papers by Steven Levitt and Je¤ Grogger, see e.g. Bronars and Grogger (1994),
Levitt (1997), and Duggan and Levitt (2002).
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identify credit constraints. The advantage of the approach used in this study is that it exploits an exogenous
shock uncorrelated with entrepreneurial activity and provides an unbiased estimate of the treatment e¤ect
under the assumption that absent the treatment outcomes for nancially constrained and unconstrained rms
would have followed parallel trends. Another advantage of this approach is that it makes use of relatively
simple information provided by rms, and thus it is less prone to the measurement error.
A well known example in the economic literature illustrating this approach is a study by Banerjee and
Duo (2004), which investigates the nature of credit constraintsby looking at the credit allocation rules of
a particular (state owned) Indian bank. They exploit a change in government preferential lending rules to
investigate whether rms would like to obtain more credit at the going interest rate than they can actually
obtain. Banerjee and Duo (2004) nd that directed credit was used to nance more production - not to
substitute for other forms of credit, and conclude that many of the rms must have been severely credit
constrained.
Other examples of this approach include related papers by Cull, McKenzie, and Woodru¤ (2007), and de
Mel, McKenzie, and Woodru¤ (2007b), which use a randomized experiment to measure the return to capital
for the average microenterprise in their sample, regardless of whether they apply for credit. They accomplish
this by providing cash and equipment grants to small rms in Sri Lanka and Mexico, and measuring the
increase in prots arising from this exogenous (positive) shock to capital stock. After controlling for possible
spillover e¤ects, the shock is found to generate large increase in the average real return to capital relative to
prevailing market interest rate. These studies interpret the increase in returns to capital as an evidence of
missing credit markets.
3 Theoretical Model
A simple two-period model is presented below to guide the empirical specication. The objective is to show
how nancial constraints inuence a rms decisions to invest privately in capital. The salient features of the
model are the assumptions that rms can (partly) cope with decient public capital, but that it is costly to
do so, and that the cost of nancing of the investment in private capital increases with the degree of nancial
market imperfections.
3.1 Model Setup
This model adapts the analytical framework developed by Reinikka and Swensson (2002).26 A risk-neutral
rm has to decide whether to make a capital investment i > 0. Investment is productive with a one-period
26The model of Reinikka and Swensson (2002) investigates rms decision to install an electric generator in the absence of
nancing constraints.
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lag. The opportunity cost of capital is c(i), with c (0) = 0; ci > 0 and cii > 0, where lower subscripts denote
rst and second derivatives. The return to i depends (partly) on the power supply, which is either publicly
provided or provided by the rms itself. There is uncertainty about the availability and quality of publicly
provided electricity supply. Firms can (partly) insure against this uncertainty by investing in complementary
capital (e.g., own a generator). However, there is a xed cost k > 0 of doing so.27 A rm that has installed
an electric generator can ensure a return (1 + r)i, where r > 0 is a xed return on investment. When the
power supply is perfectly reliable, the return is also (1 + r)i, while if it is not available (or of poor quality),
the return is (1 + r)i, where 0 <  < 1.
Financing constraints are introduced from the model of Kaplan and Zingales (1997). Investment i and
the cost of a generator k can be nanced either with internal funds (W ) or with external funds (E). The cost
of internal funds equals the opportunity cost of capital, c(i), which is the rate of return the owners of the
rm could get by investing outside the rm. Because of nancial market imperfections, it is assumed that
the use of external funds generates an additional cost. The reduced form of this cost function is represented
by g(E; ), where  is an unobservable measure of a rms wedge between the internal and the external costs
of funds, which reects the extent of agency or information problems.28 It is assumed that the total cost of
raising external funds is convex in the amount of funds raised and it increases in  (g(0; ) = g(E; 0) = 0,
gE > 0, gEE > 0, g > 0).29 For the model to be well behaved, it is also assumed that cross-partial derivative
of the total cost of raising external funds with respect to the amount of funds raised and the extent of the
agency or information problems is positive (gE > 0):30
At the time of the investment in a generator, the conditions under which production takes place are
unknown. Specically, the timing of events is as follows. Initially, in the start of Period 1, the rms obtain
information about the availability (and quality) of public power supply. This information can be used to
derive a probability that power supply will be available (and of good quality). To simplify, it is assumed that
there are only two possible outcomes: power supply is available with a probability p, and unavailable (or of
very poor quality) with a probability 1   p. This variation is partly due to large di¤erences in the priority
attached to power lines, but also to local geographical (e.g., distance to nearest voltage connection) and
political conditions in Period 1.31 With this ex ante information given, each rm makes a decision whether
27Earlier empirical work, e.g. Bental and Ravid (1982), nds that adding electric generator capacity has two main cost
components: a xed installation cost and an operating cost. These costs are typically higher than that of public supply. The
operating cost is captured in k as a present value of running costs in period 2. There is also a second-order e¤ect of the size of
investment size on k because of increasing returns to scale in electric power generation. Reinikka and Svensson (2002, p. 55)
however note that this second-order e¤ect is small, and this assumption "seems like a reasonable rst approximation."
28Kaplan and Zingales (1997, p. 174) point out that existing measures of nancing constraints discussed in the literature
(e.g. cash-ows sensitivities, rms perceptions, or institutional quality indexes) can be thought of as di¤erent proxies for
unobservable :
29Kaplan and Zingales (1997) note that this assumption is reasonable but might not be warranted if the average transaction
costs decline with loan amount. Also, see Calomiris and Himmelberg (1995).
30This assumption implies that the amount of funds rised and the degree of agency problems are complementary in rising
the cost of external funds. Thus, the cost of external funds increases faster in the amount of funds rised in presence of agency
problems. This is consistent with theory of credit supply under asymmetric information. For example, in Ja¤ee and Russells
(1976) model, the slope of credit supply function becomes steeper in the degree of default distribution, which, in turn, captures
agency problems.
31For more discussion on that subject see Reinikka and Svensson (2002), and Svensson (2000).
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or not to acquire an electric generator. In Period 2, the outcome is realized and production with or without
the newly installed capital takes place.
3.2 Equilibrium with no Financial Constraints
First, let us consider the case in which nancial constraints are not binding. In this case the rm has
either su¢ cient internal funds to nance investments (W > i + k) or has access to perfect capital markets
(g(E; ) = 0). The problem can then be solved by working backwards. At the end of Period 2, two possible
histories need to be considered:
1. The rm invests in a generator, and therefore ensures a return (1 + r)i. In this case the investors
problem can formally be stated as
max
i
(1 + r)i  c (i+ k) (1)
The optimal investment rate following this history, denoted by i1 is equal to
i1(r; k) = c
 1
i (1 + r)  k (2)
2. The rm does not invest in a generator, and has expected return of  (1+ r)i, where  = p+(1  p).
In this case the investors problem becomes
max
i
=  (1 + r)i  c (i) (3)
The optimal investment rate following this history, denoted by i2 is equal to
i2(r; p) = c
 1
i [ (1 + r)] (4)
At the end of period 1, each rm makes a decision whether or not to install private power, taking into
account the investment functions (2) and (4). The optimal choice depends on the initial information of
the availability (and quality) of publicly provided complementary capital. The condition for installing a
generator at the end of period 1 is:
(1 + r)i1   c (i1 + k)   (1 + r)i2   c (i2) (5)
The left-hand side of the equation (5) is the expected return if the rm installs a generator. The right-
hand side is the expected return if the rm chooses to rely solely on the public power supply. The main
result of the preceding analysis is summarized below.
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Proposition 1 If a nancially unconstrained rms losses from power outages are high compared to the xed
cost of an electric generator, then (1) there exists a unique p dened on a convex compact set I  [0; 1] ,
such that (5) holds as an equality, and (2) rms will always choose to install a generator if the reliability of
public power supply is less than p.
Proof. The equation (5) can be rearranged to dene the net expected return from a generator
f(p) = (1 + r)i1   c (i1 + k)   (1 + r)i2 + c (i2) : R  ! R; (6)
which is a continuous function on the I  [0; 1]. A rational prot maximizing rm will always choose to
install a generator if f(p) > 0. Let p0 = 0 and p00 = 1. Using the results (2) and (4) in (6) and rearranging
terms gives
f(p0) = (1 + r)

c 1i (1 + r)
  (1 + r)[c 1i f(1 + r)g]  c c 1i (1 + r)+ c c 1i f(1 + r)g  (1 + r)k; (7)
and
f(p00) =  (1 + r)k (8)
It can be seen from equation (8) that f(p00) < 0. The sign of f(p0) depends on parameters  and k.
Di¤erentiating (7) with respect to  (using the chain rule) and k gives
@f(p0)
@
=  (1 + r)[c 1i f(1 + r)g] < 0 (9)
and
@f(p0)
@k
=  (1 + r) < 0 (10)
It thus follows from (9) and (10) that f(p0) > 0 only if the rms losses from power outages are relatively
high compared to the xed cost of generator (e.g. both  and k are su¢ ciently small32). If f(p0) > 0 then,
by the intermediate-value theorem there exists at least one point p lying between p0 and p00, such that
f(p) = 0. Because f 0(p) =  (1   )(1 + r)i2 < 0, the function f(p) is monotonically decreasing in p, and
hence the solution f(p) = 0 is unique, which proves rst part of the proposition. The rms choose to have
electric generator if the net expected return on f(p) is positive, which is true 8 p 2 [0; p) (e.g. where the
reliability of public power supply is su¢ ciently low), which proves second part of the proposition.
32 It can be easily veried that if  = 1 then f(p0) =  (1 + r)k < 0.
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3.3 Equilibrium with Financial Constraints
Now, let us consider the case in which nancial constraints are binding. In this case the rm does not have
su¢ cient internal funds to nance investments (W < i + k) and has access to imperfect capital markets
(g(E; ) > 0). The problem can still be solved in a similar way as the previous section. At the end of period
2, there are the same two possible outcomes:
1. The rm invests in a generator, and therefore can ensure a return (1 + r)i. In this case the investors
problem can formally be stated as
max
i
(1 + r)i  c(i+ k)  g(E; ), such that i+ k =W + E (11)
which can be rewritten in the unconstrained form as
max
i
(1 + r)i  c(i+ k)  g(i+ k  W; ) (6a)
The rst order condition for the problem is
(1 + r)  ci (i+ k)  gi(i+ k  W; ) = 0 (12)
Let i01 (r; k;W; ) = argmax
i
(1+r)i c(i+k) g(i+k W; ) be the optimal investment by the nancially
constrained rm, which solves equation (12). The e¤ects of the rate of return, cost of generator, availability
of internal nance, and nancial market imperfections on the size of optimal investment can be obtained by
implicit di¤erentiation:
di01
dr
=
1
cii + gii
> 0; (13)
di01
dk
=  cik + gik
cii + gii
< 0; (14)
di01
dW
=
giw
cii + gii
> 0; (15)
and
di01
d
=   gi
cii + gii
< 0: (16)
The optimal investment thus increases in the rate of return and the availability of internal nance, and
decreases in cost of generator and the degree of nancial market imperfections.
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2. The rm does not invest in a generator, and expected return is  (1 + r)i, where  = p+ (1  p). In
this case the investors problem in the unconstrained form becomes
max
i
 (1 + r)i  c (i)  g(i W; ) (17)
The rst order condition for the problem is
 (1 + r)  ci (i)  gi(i W; ) = 0 (18)
Let i02 ( ; r;W; ) = argmax
i
 (1 + r)i   c(i)   g(i  W; ) be the optimal investment by the nancially
constrained rm, which solves the equation (18). It is straightforward to show that, as in the case discussed
above, optimal investment increases in the rate of return and the availability of internal nance, and decreases
in the degree of nancial market imperfections. The e¤ect of the power supply reliability on the size of optimal
investment can be obtained by implicit di¤erentiation:
di02
dp
=
1  
cii + gii
> 0: (19)
Optimal investment thus increases in the reliability of power supply. Similarly to analysis in the previous
section the condition for installing electric generator at the end of period 1 is
(1 + r)i01   c (i01 + k)  g(i01 + k  W; )   (1 + r)i02   c (i02)  g(i02  W; ) (20)
The results of the preceding analysis can be summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If the nancially constrained rms losses from power outages are high compared to the xed
costs of a generator and the nancial adjustment costs, (1) there exists a unique p dened on a convex
compact set I  [0; 1] , such that (20) holds as an equality, (2) p is lower than p, holding other things
constant, and (3) p declines with the degree of nancial market imperfections .
Proof. The equation (20) can be rearranged to dene the net expected return from a generator
f(p) = (1 + r)i01   c (i01 + k)  g(i01 + k  W; )   (1 + r)i02 + c (i02) + g(i02  W; ) (21)
If  = 0 then equation (21) becomes the equation (6) analyzed in the previous section. The likelihood
of reliable power supply that equalizes expected returns from choosing and not choosing a generator is then
given by p; and the optimal investments are i1 and i2.
Now consider a small increase in . We know from the result (16) that both i1 and i2 decrease but i1
decreases by a larger amount.33 Thus, the net expected return from a generator will become negative at p.
33 It follows from the results (2) and (4) that i1(p) + k > i2(p). Because g() is monotonically increasing in all arguments,
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By the result (10) i2 increases in p, therefore it should be true that at positive , the net expected return
from a generator can only increase if p declines, holding other things constant, which proves the second and
third parts of the proposition. Because f(p) is monotonic in all arguments, the p will still be unique. As
 keeps increasing the net expected return from a generator will continue to decline so p may not exist at
very high  (if the rm is redlined and does not have enough internal resources it may never choose to invest
into a private generator), which proves rst part of the proposition.
Proposition 2 summarizes the main result of the model. Financing constraints reduce a rms net expected
return from a generator, and reduce the likelihood of investment in an electric generator. Thus, holding other
things constant, rms with better access to credit are more likely to install a generator if the power outages
are frequent. Financially constrained rms invest in a generator only if the quality of public power supply
is very low.
Figure 1 illustrates the aforementioned e¤ects by providing the numerical example.34
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Figure 1
4 Stochastic Specication
The theoretical model developed in the previous section is based on the assumption that a rational prot-
maximizing rm will choose to have an electric generator if net expected return (21) is positive. In an
empirical model the reduced-form of net expected return from a generator can be written as
g(i1(p) + k  W; ) is larger than g(i2(p) W; ): Hence i1 decreases by more because larger amount will be substracted.
34The numerical example is based on the following assumptions, c(i) = ei; g(E; ) = 1
2
(E)2 ; r = 0:3; W = 0:8; 0 = 0;
1 = 0:3; k = 0:2; and  = 0:1: The model was solved in MATLAB v.R2007a.
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yit = X
0
it + 
0
it + it + "it (22)
where yit is the net expected return from a generator for a rm i in time t, Xit is a set of explanatory
variables, which, as discussed in the previous section, may include reliability of the public power supply,
availability of internal funds, cost of a generator, and return on investment, it is a proxy for nancing
constraints, it is unobserved rms idiosyncratic shock (e.g. entrepreneurial ability), and "it is the error
term. The net expected return from a generator yit is an unobservable variable. Instead, we observe
dit = 1 if yit > 0; and
dit = 0 if yit  0: (23)
where dit is observed rms investment in a private electric generator.
Based on the theoretical model discussed in the previous section one can formulate the following empiri-
cally testable hypothesis to identify the e¤ect of nancing constraints on rmschoice of private generator:
Hypothesis 1: The estimated coe¢ cient  on the proxy for nancing constraints it in equation (22) will
be negative and signicant.
The main problem in testing hypothesis 1 is that both the proxy for nancing constraints it and the
rms observed investment in electric generator dit are correlated with the rms unobserved idiosyncratic
shock it. Therefore probit estimates of (22) are biased and inconsistent. The identifying assumption for
consistent estimation of equation (22) is based on the theoretical model presented in the previous section.
It follows from the model that both nancially constrained and unconstrained rms could make di¤erent
decisions about investing in a private generator if reliability of public power supply worsens. Yet, though
reliability of power supply a¤ects the choice of electric generator, it should not be correlated with rms
idiosyncratic shock.35 Two econometric approaches that utilize this assumption are discussed below.
4.1 Endogenous Switching Regression Approach
Endogenous switching regression approach discussed by Maddala (1983), and frequently applied in the lit-
erature on nancing constraints36 , can be expressed as
Y 1i = 0 + x
0
1i1 + Z
0
1i + "1i if d1 = 0 (24)
35This happens because reliability of the power supply results from the governments decision to invest in public power
infrastructure, which is independent from a rms investment decision a¤ected by idiosyncratic shocks (e.g. entrepreneurial
ability).
36See e.g. Nabi (1989), Hu and Schiantarelli (1998), and Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001).
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Y 2i = 0 + x
0
2i2 + Z
0
2i + "2i if d1 = 1 (25)
Y 3i =W
0
i+ !i (26)
d1 =
8<: 1 if Y 3i > 0;0 if Y 3i  0 (27)
In the endogenous switching regression framework the functional form of the net expected return from
a private generator (Y ji; j = 1; 2) is assumed to vary across two regimes ("nancially constrained" and
"nancially unconstrained") as specied by the equations (24) and (25). Both equations share the same
set of explanatory variables, which, as explained above, include reliability of power supply (denoted by
xji; j = 1; 2) and other factors, such as return on investment, cost of generator, and the rms observed
idiosyncratic factors (denoted by Zji; j = 1; 2). Equation (26) is a selection equation determining which
regime applies. The variable Y 3i is a latent variable representing the cost of choosing external nancing over
internal nancing. We know from the theoretical model that this choice depends on two factors - availability
of internal funds (W ) and the degree of informational or agency problems ():The matrix Wi captures the
set of variables related to these factors, which may include rmsborrowing costs, credit demand, and risk,
as well as the nancial markets institutional characteristics. The variable d1 is a dummy variable, which
takes value of 1 if rm undertakes internal nancing, and zero otherwise. In the presence of nancial market
imperfections external funding is not a perfect substitute for internal nance, therefore d1 also indicates
whether a rm is more or less likely to be nancially constrained.
Consistent estimation of the endogenous switching model in our case is complicated because the variables
Y 1i and Y

2i are unobserved. Instead we observe d21 and d22 dened as
d21 =
8<: 1 if Y 1i > 0;0 if Y 1i  0 if d1 = 0; and (28)
d22 =
8<: 1 if Y 2i > 0;0 if Y 2i  0 if d1 = 1 (29)
Kimhi (1999) has shown that in this case the two-stage solution proposed by Maddala will result in biased
estimates. The full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimator, which corrects the bias, results from
maximization of the following likelihood function
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lnL =
X
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
d1  d22  ln

Wi
1
; X2i222 ; 2

+
+d1  (1  d22)  ln

Wi
1
; X2i222 ; 2

+
+(1  d1)  d21  ln

 Wi1 ;
X1i1
21
; 1

+
+(1  d1)  (1  d21)  ln

 Wi1 ; 
X1i1
21
; 1

9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
; (30)
where  () is cumulative distribution function of a standardized bivariate normal random variable.37
As explained above, because the unobserved rms idiosyncratic shock is uncorrelated with reliability of
power supply (e.g. Cov(xij ; !i) = 0), maximizing (30) yields consistent estimates of 1 and 2.
38 If nancial
constraints have no e¤ect on the rmsdecisions to invest in a generator given their expectations of power
outages, then the di¤erence between the estimated coe¢ cients 1 and 2 (1  2) on reliability power
supply in the equations (24) and (25) is not statistically signicant:
1   2 = 0 (31)
This inference can be tested by maximizing the likelihood function (30) both subject to the constraint
(31) and without this constraint, and then implementing the likelihood ratio test:39
 2 ln
bLRbLU ~2 [J ] ; (32)
where bLR and bLU are the estimates of the restricted and unrestricted likelihood functions, and J is the
number of restrictions. The rejection of the hypothesis that the constraint (31) is binding will indicate that
nancial constraints have e¤ect on the rmsdecisions to invest in a generator given their expectations of
power outages, and conrm the theoretical models predictions.
The advantage of the endogenous switching regression approach is that it is possible to estimate si-
multaneous equations for the rms investment and nancing decisions. It also makes use of more precise
cross-sectional data on power outages in local areas, reported at the rm level. The limitation of this ap-
proach is that it relies on cross-sectional estimates, and hence stronger assumptions (e.g. positive correlation
between current power outages reported by rm and the level of power outages at the time of buying a
generator) are needed to identify the model.40
4.2 Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences Approach
37The likelihood function (30) was maximized in the statistical package STATA v.9.2. using lf method. For more details, see
Gould, Pitblado, and Sribney (2006).
38 If nancially constrained rms make electric power sharing arrangements with nancially unconstrained rms to take
advantage of economies of scale in power generation, rms idiosyncratic shock will be correlated with reliability of power
supply, and estimated coe¢ cients will be biased and inconsistent. There is no evidence of such arrangements in the data the
hypothesis is tested.
39For more details on the likelihood ratio test, see e.g. Greene (2003).
40Another complication from the endogenous switching regression approach arises if some rms are located in the areas
without access to public power supply, because the rmsdecisions to install private generators in this case will be di¤erent.
This complication is addressed because all rms used in this study indicated they had an access to public grid.
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Di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach uses pre-period di¤erences in outcomes between treatment and control
groups to control for pre-existing di¤erences between the groups, when data exists both before and after
the treatment.41 To illustrate this approach, let us sort the rms into two groups. Group T is a¤ected
by the power outage shocks ("treated") in period 1 and una¤ected by power outage shocks ("untreated")
in period 0. Group C is never treated. Denote by yT1 (y
C
1 ) the realization of rmsdecisions to invest in
electric generator in period 1 (after the power outages occur), and yT0 (y
C
0 ) the realization of rms decisions
to invest in electric generator in period 0 (before the power outages).
The di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator is given by
dDD = [ bE[yT1 jT ]  bE[yT0 jT ]]  [ bE[yC1 jC]  bE[yC0 jC]]; (33)
and provides an unbiased estimate of the treatment e¤ect under the following assumptions:
1. Treatments are exogenous to time and group xed e¤ects.42 This assumption is satised because power
outage shocks are typically caused by random events, such as draughts, natural disasters, or purposeful
(e.g. terrorist) attacks.43
2. [ bE[yC1 jT ]  bE[yC0 jT ]] = [ bE[yC1 jC]  bE[yC0 jC]]; i.e., absent the treatment the outcomes in the two groups
would have followed parallel trends.44 This critical assumption is satised because the theoretical
model discussed in the previous section predicts that in the absence of power outage shocks neither
nancially unconstrained nor nancially constrained rms would invest in a private generator.
Because there is more than one time period and more than one treatment group in the observed data,
this study adopts the xed-e¤ects estimator, which generalizes the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach. The
xed-e¤ects models estimated in this study are given by
yijt = + 1  POjt + 2  POjt  FCj + 0j3 + x0ij4 + "ijt;8<: d1ijt = 1 if yijt > 0;d1ijt = 0 if yijt  0; (34)
41The discussion in this paragraph closely follows Duo, Glennerster, and Kremer (2007, pp. 12-13).
42See Besley and Case (2000).
43The relationship between power outage shocks and the cost of nance could be endogenous if nancial institutions respond
to power outage shocks by reducing lending to avoid credit losses due to increased output volatility. To test for this possibility
the growth of domestic credit to private sector was regressed on the dummy variable for power outages, and a series of country
and time dummy variables. Contrary to the endogeneity hypothesis the estimated coe¢ cient was positive and signicant.
44See Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan (2004).
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yijt = i + 
0
t1 + 2  POjt  FCjt + 0j3 + x0ij4 + "ijt;8<: d2ijt = 1 if yijt > 0;d2ijt = 0 if yijt  0; (35)
and
yijt = + 2  FCjt + 0j3 + x0ij4 + "ijt;8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
d3ijt = 3 if 2 < y

ijt;
d3ijt = 2 if 1 < y

ijt  2;
d3ijt = 1 if 0 < y

ijt  1;
d3ijt = 0 if y

ijt  0;
: (36)
The dependent variable yijt in the specications (34)-(36) is unobserved net expected return from adding
an electric generator. In the models (34)-(35) the observed realization of yijt is the choice of generator. In
the model (36) the observed realization of yijt is a categorical variable, which takes values of zero if a rm
did not invest in a generator, the value of one if the rm invested in a generator in the absence of serious
(at the state level) power outages, the value of two if the rm invested in a generator during power outages,
and the value of three if the rm invested in a generator following a series of power outages.
The explanatory variables are the observed periods of disruptions in public power supply POjt, countries
time-invariant and time-varying nancial systems performance indicators FCjt and FCj , vector of rm
characteristics x0ij , and country and year dummies 
0
j and 
0
t respectively. The subscripts i; j; and t denote
the rm, country, and time e¤ects, respectively, and "ijt is the error term. In the model (36) s are unknown
parameters to be estimated with s.
The models (34)-(35) are estimated by logit. The model (36) is estimated by ordered logit.45 The
inferences from the theoretical model discussed in the previous section can then be veried by testing if the
estimated coe¢ cient 2 is positive and signicant in specications (34)-(36). This implies that the likelihood
of investing in an electric generator during power outages is higher in the countries with better nancial
systems.
The advantage of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach is in its simplicity as well as the potential to
circumvent many of the endogeneity problems that typically arise when making comparisons between het-
erogeneous groups under less restrictive assumptions.46 However, obtaining statistically signicant results
45For more details on logit and ordered logit models, see e.g. Greene (2003). All models were estimated in statistical package
STATA v.9.2.
46 e.g. endogeneity arising from omitted entry and exit variable bias (see Clementi and Hopenhayn, 2006) for discussion of
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could more complicated because it makes use of less precise state-level information on power supply reliability
and quality of nancial systems.
5 Data
The lack of a good quality rm-level data has been a substantial limitation to the research on credit con-
straints and rm behavior. This study makes use of a new dataset compiled from the World Bank Enterprise
Surveys (WBES) collected from 2002 to 2006.47 The WBES data capture business perceptions of the biggest
obstacles to enterprise growth, the relative importance of various constraints to increasing employment and
productivity, and the e¤ects of a countrys investment climate on its international competitiveness.
The enterprise survey questions are concerned with factors constraining the e¤ective functioning of the
product and nancial markets, focusing on the weaknesses in an economys infrastructure, law enforcement,
public administration, and regulatory framework. The enterprise surveys sample from the universe of regis-
tered businesses48 and follow a stratied random sampling method.49 The enterprise survey is condential
to protect the respondents.50
5.1 Sample Selection
The entire WBES dataset comprises information from surveys of over 60,000 rms in 97 developing countries.
The analysis in this study is restricted to a selection of 860 rms from 3 Sub-Saharan African countries
for implementation of the endogenous switching regression approach, and a subset of 1309 rms from 12
Sub-Saharan African countries for implementation of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach. These samples
were chosen to ensure better compliance with the assumptions of the theoretical model and the stochastic
specications. Specically, the following sample selection criteria were used.
First, one of the critical assumptions of the theoretical model discussed in the previous section is that a
rm purchases a generator to prevent loss on the productive investment from power outages. Therefore, the
sample should be restricted to regions where power outages are frequent. One of such regions is Sub-Saharan
Africa51 , where the main reason for electric generator ownership is related to poor quality of electric power
infrastructure.52 . In other regions, private generator ownership is frequently not related to the quality of
this bias).
47For detailed information on the World Bank enterprise surveys, see WBES website at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/.
48 e.g. rms listed in a countrys enterprise register.
49The sample is stratied on the basis of rms location, industry, and size contribution to a countrys GDP. Because the
distribution of establishments in most countries is overwhelmingly populated by small and medium enterprises, surveys may
over-sample large establishments.
50Condentiality provisions are especially necessary if the rms are underreporting their income or wages to public agencies.
51Another region, which saties this assumption is South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh). Unfortunately, good quality
data were not available for this region.
52Estache (2005), Foster and Steinbuks (2007).
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public power supply and therefore this assumption is unlikely to be satised.53
Second, both empirical approaches require exogeneity of power outages in the generator choice equations.
In some countries, the governments pursue active regional policies by providing substantial public capital
and creating other incentives for productive businesses to stimulate growth in selected areas.54 Then, the
relationship between location-specic power outages and generation ownership may be endogenous because
as a result of such policies more productive (and less nancially constrained) rms may start up in the
locations with more reliable power supply. The sample therefore should be restricted to regions, where
active regional investment policies are not implemented. Sub-Saharan African countries t this criterion,
because implementation of such policies is limited by political instability, corruption, ethnical fragmentations
and clan struggles (Easterly and Levine, 1997). Power outages are thus exogenous to entrepreneurial ability
and reect underperformance of power sector institutions, that are mainly characterized by unreliability of
power supply, low capacity utilization, decient maintenance, poor procurement of spare parts, and high
transmission and distribution losses among other problems (Karekezi and Kimani, 2002).55
Third, because the endogenous switching approach relies on cross-sectional data it is important that the
information on power supply reported by the rms at the year of survey be correlated with the state of
the power infrastructure at the time of installing a generator.56 The sample therefore should also exclude
developing countries where economic and structural reforms rendered them able to improve their public
power supply signicantly and reduce power outages. In Sub-Saharan Africa despite some reforms initiated
in 1990s, only limited progress has been achieved.57
Based on the selection criteria discussed above, the sample for the di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach was
reduced to countries from Sub-Saharan Africa. To minimize the e¤ect of other large exogenous shocks
a¤ecting the rms investment decisions, countries in armed conict (e.g. Sierra Leone, Angola, Burundi)
and with severe public governance breaches (e.g. Zimbabwe) were excluded from the sample.58 The sample
also excludes countries with little variation in generator ownership (e.g. in Nigeria 100 percent of rms
owned a generator) with the exception of South Africa, which has reliable power infrastructure and developed
nancial markets, and provides a good comparison basis for the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach.59 The
sample includes only rms that started operations after 1990, when most economic reforms in the region
53 It happens for other reasons, such as compliance with safety standards, industry-specic requirements, and the adoption of
environmentally friendly technologies or economic gains (e.g. from cogeneration).
54The impact of these policies has not been yet clearly established. For example, de la Fuente and Vives (1995) nd that
investment in infrastructure has made only a small contribution to regional convergence in Spain. On the other hand, Demurger
(2001) concludes that infrastructure endowment did account signicantly for observed di¤erences in growth performance across
provinces in China.
55To test for exogeneity of location, the quality of power supply (measured by days of power outages) was regressed on a series
of rms characteristics, and spatial dummy variables. Spatial characteristics were not signicant for any of three countries
used in endogenous switching regression model.
56For most rms in the sample the gap between survey year and installing own generation was small (about 2 - 3 years), but
for some rms it was larger (about 10 years).
57Estache (2005).
58Though sample includes Erirea and Uganda, it does not comprise areas a¤ected by armed conicts (border regions between
Eritrea and Somalia, and Uganda and Sudan).
59The results were not sensitive to the exclusion of South Africa.
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took place.
The cross-sectional nature of the endogenous switching approach makes it more sensitive to measurement
errors. To minimize the impact of the measurement errors, the cross-sectional analysis was further reduced
to three countries - Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. These three countries were selected for several reasons.
First, the surveys on these countries were performed during the same year (2002) by the same company,
and using the identical survey instrument. Second, these countries are more comparable because of cultural
and institutional similarities originating from their common British colonial past, and strong economic and
political ties in the East African Community (EAC).60 Third, public power supply in all three countries
depends heavily on hydro-generation, and power outages are frequently caused by the same factor (e.g.
drought). Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are also developing plans to share power supplies, including a
regional energy interconnectivity plan that will enable any EAC country to connect with another nations
electricity supply.61
5.2 Empirical Specication
This section discusses the variables used in the stochastic specication. Based on the theoretical model, a
rms choice of a generator depends on reliability of power supply (positively), cost of a generator (negatively),
return on investment (uncertain), availability of internal funds (non-negatively), and a proxy for nancing
constraints (negatively). Tables 1 and 2 summarize the variables representing these factors.62
Table 1 presents the variables used in the endogenous switching approach, summarized at country level
for Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. In the regime-switching equations (24) and (25), reliability of the power
supply is measured by the number of days per year when rms experienced power outages. The theoretical
model predicts that higher power outages have positive e¤ects on the probability of investing in a generator.
Table 1 shows that all three countries have very unreliable power supply, with average days of power outages
per annum ranging from 67 in Tanzania to 82 in Kenya. It is therefore not surprising to observe that sixty
eight percent of surveyed rms in Kenya, fty eight percent of rms in Tanzania, and thirty eight percent of
rms in Uganda owned a generator in 2002. The information on the cost of a generator and the return on
investment is assumed to be captured by rmscharacteristics, measured by size, industry63 and ownership
dummies.64 Specically, because electric generation exhibits economies of scale, larger rms are expected to
have smaller generation costs, and higher probability of owning a generator.
As regards the selection equation (26), operationalization of variables is similar to the approach of Bigsten,
Collier, Dercon et al (2003). Firmschoice of internal over external nancing is represented by the share of
60For more information on the East African Community, see http://www.eac.int/.
61Source: U.S. Department of Energy website: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/eafrica.html.
62For more details, also see tables 1 - 8, Appendix 1.
63 Industry dummies also capture important information about energy intensity in rms production process. Quality of
electric power infrastructure is endogenous to observed industrial structure. Sorting out this problem is beyond the scope of
this study.
64Detailed summary of these variable can be found in tables 1 to 4, appendix 1.
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rms nancing more than 90 percent of their working capital from the retained earnings. Table 1 shows that
this share was only 30 percent of surveyed rms in Kenya, compared with 62 percent of rms in Tanzania,
and 68 percent of rms in Uganda. Availability of internal funds is measured by the share of rms indicating
that they never applied for a loan, because they did not need one. This share was 18 percent in Kenya,
10 percent in Tanzania, and 12 percent in Uganda. According to the model, availability of internal funds
increases likelihood of owning a generator. On the other hand, 24 percent of surveyed rms in Kenya never
applied for a loan because of other reasons, such as high collateral requirements, large debt burden, or
complicated administrative procedures, compared to 50 percent of rms in Tanzania, and 47 percent of rms
in Uganda. As discussed earlier, these reasons may indicate that rm is nancially constrained, and is more
likely to choose internal over external nancing.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (3 Countries Dataset)
Variable
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Share of firms owning a generator 0.68 0.47 0.58 0.49 0.38 0.49
Power outages (days per annum) 81.69 103.78 66.85 65.04 70.32 99.21
Share of firms financing more than 90% of working
capital from retained earnings 0.30 0.46 0.62 0.49 0.68 0.47
Share of firms that never applied for a loan because it
was not needed 0.18 0.39 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.32
Share of firms that never applied for a loan because of
other reasons 0.24 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.50
Share of firms that were rejected a loan 0.03 0.18 0.07 0.25 0.03 0.16
Share of firms that currently have a loan 0.32 0.47 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.38
Share of firms with LTV less than 50% 0.12 0.33 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.18
Share of firms with LTV between 50% and 75% 0.04 0.21 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.16
Share of firms with LTV between 75% and 100% 0.12 0.32 0.08 0.28 0.03 0.18
Share of firms with LTV more than 100% 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19 0.08 0.26
Kenya Tanzania Uganda
The extent of the agency or information problems  is proxied by several variables. The share of rms
that were rejected for a loan may indicate a non-price rationing (redlining) due to asymmetric information,
as discussed in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). According to the data, 7 percent of surveyed rms in Tanzania and
3 percent of rms in Kenya and Uganda were rejected a loan. These rms may be nancially constrained,
and are more likely to choose internal over external nancing. For rms with a loan, the di¤erential cost of
external over internal is nancing is captured by collateral requirements. The theory of credit supply under
asymmetric information predicts that, holding other things constant, loans secured by collateral are less
costly.65 Table 1 shows that, about a half of the rms with a bank loan in Kenya, two-thirds of rms with a
bank loan in Uganda and 75 percent of rms with a bank loan in Tanzania had the loan to value ratio above
75 percent. It is expected that rms with high loan-to-value ratio are more likely to choose internal over
65Collateral requirements are measured by rms response to the Enterprise survey question "What was the approximate
value of collateral required as a percentage of the loan value?"
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external nancing. The institutional nancial market characteristics are represented by country dummies.
Among three countries, Kenya has the most developed nancial system. The World Bank Doing Business
(2007) report ranks Kenya 33rd among the world countries in the overall ease of getting credit, whereas
Tanzania and Uganda are ranked 117th and 159th respectively. Therefore, the anticipated coe¢ cient in the
selection equation for the Kenyan country dummy variable is negative. Selection equation (26) also includes
rm characteristics, such as size, industry and ownership. Consistent with earlier ndings from the literature
on nancing constraints66 it is expected that larger and foreign owned rms are less likely to face nancing
constraints, and are more likely to choose external nancing over internal nancing.
Table 2 summarizes the variables used in the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach for 1309 rms from 12
Sub-Saharan African countries, which started their operation after 1990. Because time-series data on power
outages and the cost of external nancing were not available at the rm-level, the aggregate indicators were
used in panel dataset. The data on power outages came from the International Energy Annual (2004),
published by Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy. The data on the cost of
external nancing came from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) and Doing Business
databases.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (12 Countries Dataset)
Country
Credit
Information
index
Credit Registry
Coverage
mean sd mean sd mean sd (% of adults)
Benin 0.20 0.40 0.57 0.51 0.06 0.33 1 3.5
Eritrea 0.38 0.50 0.30 0.48 0.19 0.24 0 0
Kenya 0.68 0.47 0.17 0.38 -0.01 0.08 2 0.1
Madagascar 0.18 0.38 0.13 0.34 -0.04 0.12 1 0.3
Malawi 0.35 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.06 0.20 0 0
Mali 0.41 0.50 0.12 0.33 0.03 0.13 1 2.3
Mauritius 0.28 0.45 0.25 0.44 0.06 0.10 0 0
Senegal 0.52 0.50 0.13 0.33 -0.02 0.06 1 4.3
South Africa 0.06 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.13 5 63.4
Tanzania 0.56 0.50 0.23 0.42 -0.09 0.10 0 0
Uganda 0.26 0.44 0.21 0.41 0.11 0.33 0 0
Zambia 0.20 0.41 0.17 0.39 0.01 0.25 0 0
Periods of Power
Outages
Growth in Domestic
Credit
Share of Firms
Owning a
Generator
Table 2 shows that there is a considerable variation across countries in the share of rms having a
private generator, ranging from 6 percent in South Africa to 68 percent in Kenya. There are also signicant
di¤erences across countries in the average periods of power outages, measured as a signicant (more than 10
percent) increase in countrys electricity distribution losses.67 Starting from 1990 the most frequent power
66Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005)
67For more robustness this measure was checked against the country average days of power outages, reported by the rms
from the WBES data in 2002-2005. The Spearman correlation coe¢ cient was 0.5.
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outages were in Benin (57% of surveyed periods), Malawi (35% of surveyed periods), and Eritrea (30% of
surveyed periods). The most reliable power supply was in South Africa (0% percent of surveyed periods).68
Table 2 also presents the summary statistics on the country-level measures of cost of external nance.
Costs of external nance are lower in countries with more developed nancial markets.69 Financial market
institutional characteristics are measured by the World Banks Doing Business credit information index
and credit registry coverage indicator.70 The credit information index measures rules a¤ecting the scope,
accessibility and quality of credit information available through either public or private credit registries. The
credit registry coverage indicator reports the number of individuals and rms listed in a public or private
credit registry with current information on repayment history, unpaid debts or credit outstanding.71 Higher
values of both indicators are associated with better nancial market institutional characteristics. External
nance costs are also a¤ected by monetary policy, and are negatively correlated with growth in domestic
credit (with domestic credit measured by the ratio of banking sector credit to private sector to surveyed
countries GDP72). It follows from table 2, that, among surveyed countries, South Africa has the most
developed nancial infrastructure, yet the domestic credit was frequently growing faster in countries with
less developed nancial systems (e.g. Eritrea, Malawi and Uganda).
6 Empirical Results
6.1 Endogenous Switching Approach
Tables 3, 4, and 5 summarize the results from the endogenous switching regression approach described by
the equations (24)-(29). Table 3 shows the estimates from the selection equation, formulated by (26) and
(27). The signs of the estimated coe¢ cients correspond to the predictions of economic theory. Borrowers
with low loan-to-value ratios, foreign owned rms, and Kenyan businesses are more likely to choose external
nancing. Firms that were not able to apply for a loan because of red tape, high collateral requirements or
the debt burden are more likely to choose internal nancing. The estimated coe¢ cients for rms that did
not apply for a loan because it was not needed, and for the size and industry characteristics variables are
not statistically signicant in the selection equation.
68According to the WBES data there are rare occasions of power outages in South Africa (about 6 days per year). This may
explain why some rms own an electric generator in this country.
69See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), and Love (2003).
70These indicators can be found on the World Banks Doing Business website http://www.doingbusiness.org
71Though these two measures do not vary by time, they reect an important information about the surveyed countries
nancial systems. Di¤erent research studies, including La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), Love and
Mylenko (2003), and Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) found that credit registries are associated with lower nancing
constraints and higher share of bank nancing.
72This measure has been previously used in the economic literature, see e.g. Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000), and Barth,
Caprio, and Levine (2004)
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Table 3: Selection Equation
Equation: d1= (W
0
i) + !i: Dep. var. (d1): Firm nances more than 90% of working capital from retained earnings (1 =
"Yes")
Variable coeff. p-value Exp. Sign
Current loan: LTV less than 50% (1="Yes") -0.83 0.00 -
Current loan: LTV between 50% and 75% (1= "Yes") -0.89 0.01 -
Current loan: LTV between 75% and 100% (1="Yes") -0.45 0.02
Current loan: LTV more than 100% (1="Yes") -0.21 0.35
Never applied for a loan because it was not needed (1 = "Yes") 0.13 0.43
Never applied for a loan because of other reasons (1 = "Yes") 0.33 0.01 +
Loan application rejected (1 = "Yes") 0.55 0.03 +
Country: Kenya -0.90 0.00 -
Country: Tanzania -0.19 0.16
Industry: Garments and Textiles 0.06 0.73
Industy: Food and Beverages -0.14 0.39
Industry: Metals and Machinery -0.04 0.81
Industry: Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals -0.21 0.25
Firm's Size: Less than 10 Employees 0.29 0.12 +
Firm's Size: 10 - 49 Employees -0.02 0.92
Firm's Size: 50 - 99 Employees -0.26 0.17
Foreign Ownership (1 = "Yes") -0.37 0.01 -
Constant 0.51 0.02
Number of Observations 659
Table 4 compares the predicted values for the dependent variable, based on the regression model in the
selection equation, with the actual observed values in the data. Table 4 shows that the selection equation
correctly predicts 78% of rms that rely solely on internal nancing (constrained rms), and 64% of rms
that use external funds to nance their working capital (unconstrained rms). Overall, the selection equation
correctly classies 71% of rms, which is an improvement over naive model that blindly estimates the most
frequent category (constrained rms) for all cases, and correctly classies just 54% of rms.
Table 4: Selection Equation - Classication Table
Switching Regression Classification Constrained Unconstrained Total
Constrained 279 109 388
Unconstrained 80 191 271
Total 359 300 659
Correctly classified 78% 64% 71%
True Classification
Table 5 illustrates the results from the switching regressions (24) and (25). A comparison of the estimated
coe¢ cients for reliability of power supply in the switching regressions strongly supports the hypothesis that
nancial constraints a¤ect the rmsdecisions to invest in a generator given their expectations of power
outages. The estimated coe¢ cient of the logarithm of days of power outages in the generator choice equation
for rms that externally nance their working capital is statistically signicant and nearly ten times higher
than the corresponding coe¢ cient in the equation for rms that nance their working capital from retained
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earnings. The likelihood ratio test (32) rejects the hypothesis that the estimated coe¢ cients are equal in the
switching equations at the 0.03 level of signicance.
As regards other explanatory variables, in both equations larger rms are found more likely to install
an electric generator. This may reect e¤ect of the economies of scale or technical requirements and safety
standards with which the larger rms are more likely to comply. The estimated coe¢ cient is positive and
signicant for the metals and machinery industry in the equation for external nancing, which may reect
energy intensity of this industry. The estimated coe¢ cient is also positive and signicant for foreign owned
rms in the equation for internal nancing, which may capture the share of less constrained rms among
those nancing working capital from retained earnings. Country dummies are not statistically signicant
in either equation, except for Tanzania in the equation for internal nancing, which is positive, but only
marginally signicant. This coe¢ cient may reect unobserved nancial market institutional characteristics in
Tanzania. The correlation coe¢ cients (rhos) between the residuals in the selection and switching equations
are large and statistically signicant for both switching equations. This conrms simultaneity in choice of
electric generator and rms nancing constraints.73
Table 5: Switching Regression Equations
Equations: d2j= (0 + x
0
jij + Z
0
ji) + "ji: j = 1; 2: Dep. vars. (d21, d22): Firm owns a generator (1 = "Yes")
coeff. p-value coeff. p-value
Days of Power Outages (log) 0.19 0.00 0.02 0.73
Country: Kenya -0.06 0.82 -0.19 0.43
Country: Tanzania 0.07 0.75 0.31 0.06
Industry: Garments and Textiles 0.04 0.87 0.31 0.17
Industy: Food and Beverages 0.26 0.29 0.16 0.38
Industry: Metals and Machinery 0.51 0.05 0.25 0.24
Industry: Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 0.21 0.43 0.08 0.76
Firm's Size: Less than 10 Employees -1.31 0.00 -1.37 0.00
Firm's Size: 10 - 49 Employees -0.78 0.00 -0.71 0.02
Firm's Size: 50 - 99 Employees -0.11 0.69 -0.08 0.77
Foreign Ownership (1 = "Yes") 0.10 0.62 0.60 0.03
Constant 0.63 0.18 -0.30 0.38
Rho 0.72 0.01 0.83 0.00
Number of Observations
LR Test: chi2(1)  =  4.77, Prob > chi2 = 0.0289
Equation d21 (d1 = 0) Equation d22 (d1 = 1)
659 659
The results from the endogenous switching approach, tested on the data from Kenya, Tanzania, and
Uganda, thus fully correspond to the predictions of the theoretical model described in the previous section.
Holding other things constant, rms that nance their working capital from external funds are more likely to
install the generator in the localities where the power outages are more frequent. This happens because these
rms are less likely to be nancially constrained, and therefore their net expected return from a generator
73Tables 9a and 9b (Appendix 1) illustate that exogenous swirching regression estimates of the same stochastic specication
are seriously biased.
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is higher. The theoretical model predicts that nancially constrained rms invest in a generator only if
the quality of public power supply is very low. Consistent with that prediction of the model, the choice of
electric generator is una¤ected by small di¤erences in the reliability of power supply for rms that nance
their working capital solely from internal funds, and are more likely to be nancially constrained.
6.2 Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences Approach
This section discusses ndings from the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach. As discussed earlier, the hy-
pothesis is that the estimated coe¢ cient of the product of power outages and nancial development (2) is
positive and signicant in stochastic specications (34)-(36). Tables 6, 7, and 8 contain the test results.74
The predictions from all three models conrm the hypothesis that during the periods of power outages rms
from the countries with nancially developed markets are more likely to buy generators.
Table 6 shows the ndings from the model 1, described by the equation (34) which employs time-invariant
indices of nancial markets institutional characteristics for the cost of external nancing. The estimated
coe¢ cients on the product of power outages and the cost of external nancing are all positive and signicant.
The size and signicance levels of the estimated coe¢ cients increase with the degree of countriesnancial
development. For example, the estimated coe¢ cients on power outages in countries with no registry coverage
are positive but not signicant. The estimated coe¢ cient is only marginally signicant when sole existence
of public or private registries was used as the measure of nancial development. The estimated coe¢ cient
increases both in size and the level of signicance when only countries with actual registry coverage (at least
3% of all adults) are considered as nancially developed.
Table 6: Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences: Model 1
Dependent variable: Firm owns a generator (1 = "Yes")
Variable Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Power Outages (1 = "Yes") 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09
Registry Coverage > 0 X Power Outages 0.17 0.09
Registry Coverage > 3% X Power Outages 0.22 0.05
Credit Information Index > 1 X Power Outages 0.47 0.00
Constant -0.28 0.48 -0.28 0.47 -0.28 0.48
Wald chi2(27) 263.36 0.00 263.35 0.00 272.62 0.00
Number of obs 8201 8201 8201
Table 7 illustrates the results for model 2, described by the equation (35), which uses the growth in
domestic credit as a measure for the cost of external nancing. The estimated coe¢ cient on the product
74Full results, including the estimates of the xed e¤ects and the control variables are reported in the appendix 2, tables 9,
10, and 11. The standard errors used in computation of p-values were adjusted for heteroscedaticity and cluster correlations.
For details, see Wooldridge (2002, section 13.8.2).
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of power outages and domestic credit growth is positive and signicant, suggesting that, consistent with
predictions of the theoretical model, the probability of installing an electric generator during power outages
is higher in countries experiencing rapid growth of domestic credit.
Table 7: Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences: Model 2
Dependent variable: Firm owns a generator (1 = "Yes")
Variable Coef. P-value
Power Outages X Domestic Credit Growth 0.43 0.01
Constant -0.25 0.56
Wald chi2(39) 441.06 0.00
Number of obs 8166
Table 8 presents the results from the model 3, described by the equation (36), and estimated by ordered
logit.75 Again the results are consistent with theoretical expectations. The estimated coe¢ cient of the
domestic credit growth variable is positive and signicant. To understand better the e¤ect of a countrys
nancial development on rms decision to buy generator, table 8 also presents the computed marginal
e¤ects.76 One percent increase in domestic credit increases the probability of buying a generator by 0.07 at
stable power supply. The probability of buying a generator further increases by 0.02 during power outages,
and by 0.001 after consecutive power outages. These gures sum to 0.091, which indicates the total marginal
e¤ect of a one percent increase in domestic credit growth on the probability of installing an electric generator.
All marginal e¤ects are statistically signicant.
Table 8: Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences: Model 3
Dependent variable: Firm bought a generator at stable power supply (1 = "Yes"), Firm bought a generator during outages (2 =
"Yes"), Firm bought a generator after consecutive outages (3 = "Yes")
Variable
Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Domestic Credit Growth 0.68 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.001 0.00
mu1 1.98
mu2 4.74
Wald chi2(26) 313.30 0.00
Number of obs 8464
Regression coeff. Marginal effect (d=1) Marginal effect (d=2) Marginal effect (d=3)
75Time-invariant measures of nancial deepening could not be used in the ordered logit model because of perfect collinearity
problem.
76For details on interpreting coe¢ cients and the marginal e¤ects in ordered logit equations, see Greene (2003, chapter 21).
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7 Conclusions
This study uses indirect testing techniques to identify and measure the e¤ects of access to capital on rms
in developing countries. Recent economic research has shown that poor public capital signicantly reduces
productive investment by rms. If nancial markets are functioning well, rms can cope with decient public
capital by investing in private capital, which substitutes for public services. The major cost to rms comes
from the installation of less productive capital.
This paper investigates the e¤ect of nancing constraints on a rms ability to substitute for decient
public services by investing in private capital. The theoretical model focuses on a rms decision to acquire
a private generator to hedge against unreliable public power supply. It shows that holding other things
constant, nancially unconstrained rms will be more likely to install private generator if the public power
supply becomes unreliable.
The e¤ect of nancing constraints on a rms decision to install a private generator is investigated
empirically on rm-level datasets from Sub-Saharan African countries where power interruptions are not
uncommon and nancial systems vary in their development. Both endogenous switching regression and
di¤erence-in-di¤erences methods are used to overcome the measurement and identication problems arising
from simultaneity of nancing constraints and rmsinvestment.
The results show that, controlling for other factors, rms with a better access to credit are also more
likely to own a private generator in areas, where public power supply is unreliable. The results also indicate
that rms are more likely to respond to the power outage shocks, by installing private generators if they
operate in the countries with more developed nancial systems or during the periods of rapid domestic credit
growth.
These results have important policy implications. If poor provision of public capital has a signicant
e¤ect on rmscapital accumulation, and scal constraints hamper investment in infrastructure, a nancial
sector reform can open bottlenecks for private provision of complementary capital, and thus create conditions
for improvement in the private sector development.
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Appendix 1
Table 1: 3 Countries Dataset - Tabulation by Country
Country Frequency Share
Kenya 205 31.11%
Tanzania 189 28.68%
Uganda 265 40.21%
Total 659 100.00%
Table 2: 3 Countries Dataset - Tabulation by Industry
Industry Frequency Share
Garments and Textiles 117 17.75%
Food and Beverages 173 26.25%
Metals and Machinery 123 18.66%
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 89 13.51%
Wood, Pulp and Furniture 157 23.82%
Total 659 100.00%
Table 3: 3 Countries Dataset - Tabulation by Size
Size Frequency Share
Less than 10 Employees 153 23.22%
10 - 50 Employees 296 44.92%
50 - 100 Employees 96 14.57%
More than 100 Employees 114 17.30%
Total 659 100.00%
Table 4: 3 Countries Dataset - Tabulation by Ownership
Ownership Frequency Percent
Domestic 517 78.45%
Foreign 142 21.55%
Total 659 100.00%
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Table 5: 12 Countries Dataset - Tabulation by Country
Country Frequency Share
Benin 119 9.09%
Eritrea 21 1.60%
Kenya 78 5.96%
Madagascar 160 12.22%
Malawi 94 7.18%
Mali 80 6.11%
Mauritius 67 5.12%
Senegal 122 9.32%
South Africa 154 11.76%
Tanzania 129 9.85%
Uganda 202 15.43%
Zambia 83 6.34%
Total 1309 100.00%
Table 6: 12 Countries Dataset - Tabulation by Industry
Industry Frequency Share
Garments and Textiles 172 13.14%
Food and Beverages 349 26.66%
Metals and Machinery 137 10.47%
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 107 8.17%
Construction 56 4.28%
Wood, Pulp and Furniture 225 17.19%
Non-metallic and Plastic Materials 73 5.58%
Paper 54 4.13%
Other Manufacturing 63 4.81%
Hotels and Restaurants 73 5.58%
1309 100.00%
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Table 7: 12 Countries Dataset - Tabulation by Size
Size Frequency Share
Less than 10 Employees 244 18.64%
10 - 50 Employees 630 48.13%
50 - 100 Employees 199 15.20%
100-250 Employees 127 9.70%
More than 250 Employees 109 8.33%
Total 1309 100.00%
Table 8: 12 Countries Dataset - Tabulation by Ownership
Ownership Frequency Share
Domestic 989 75.55%
Foreign 320 24.45%
Total 1309 100.00%
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Table 9a Switching Regession Models (Firms with External Financing of Working Capital)
Model
coeff. p-value coeff. p-value
Days of Power Outages (log) 0.08 0.08 0.19 0.00
Country: Kenya 0.84 0.00 -0.06 0.82
Country: Tanzania 0.13 0.41 0.07 0.75
Industry: Garments and Textiles -0.02 0.91 0.04 0.87
Industy: Food and Beverages 0.24 0.19 0.26 0.29
Industry: Metals and Machinery 0.29 0.12 0.51 0.05
Industry: Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 0.36 0.08 0.21 0.43
Firm's Size: Less than 10 Employees -1.31 0.00 -1.31 0.00
Firm's Size: 10 - 49 Employees -0.50 0.00 -0.78 0.00
Firm's Size: 50 - 99 Employees 0.13 0.49 -0.11 0.69
Foreign Ownership (1 = "Yes") 0.46 0.00 0.10 0.62
Constant -1.01 0.00 0.63 0.18
Number of Observations
Exogenous switching
(d1 = 0)
659
Endogenous switching
(d1 = 0)
659
Table 9b Switching Regession Models (Firms with Internal Financing of Working Capital)
Model
coeff. p-value coeff. p-value
Days of Power Outages (log) 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.25
Country: Kenya -0.44 0.00 -0.19 0.01
Country: Tanzania 0.18 0.41 0.31 0.20
Industry: Garments and Textiles 0.25 0.91 0.31 0.19
Industy: Food and Beverages 0.08 0.19 0.16 0.64
Industry: Metals and Machinery 0.14 0.12 0.25 0.44
Industry: Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.93
Firm's Size: Less than 10 Employees -0.96 0.00 -1.37 0.00
Firm's Size: 10 - 49 Employees -0.35 0.00 -0.71 0.02
Firm's Size: 50 - 99 Employees -0.10 0.49 -0.08 0.61
Foreign Ownership (1 = "Yes") 0.13 0.00 0.60 0.34
Constant -0.62 0.00 -0.30 0.02
Number of Observations
Exogenous switching
(d1 = 1)
Endogenous switching
(d1 = 1)
659 659
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Table 10: Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences Approach (Model 1)
Variable Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Country: Benin -1.07 0.00 -1.11 0.00 -0.97 0.00
Country: Eritrea -0.02 0.97 -0.02 0.96 -0.02 0.97
Country: Kenya 0.26 0.33 0.29 0.28 0.21 0.43
Country: Madagascar -2.19 0.00 -2.17 0.00 -2.17 0.00
Country: Malawi -0.96 0.00 -0.97 0.00 -0.97 0.00
Country: Mali 0.23 0.48 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43
Country: Mauritius -1.07 0.00 -1.07 0.00 -1.07 0.00
Country: Senegal 0.15 0.58 0.15 0.59 0.17 0.52
Country: South Africa -2.33 0.00 -2.33 0.00 -2.33 0.00
Country: Uganda -0.61 0.02 -0.61 0.02 -0.61 0.02
Country: Zambia -1.66 0.00 -1.66 0.00 -1.66 0.00
Industry: Garments and Textiles -0.58 0.11 -0.58 0.11 -0.58 0.11
Industry: Food and Beverages -0.01 0.97 -0.01 0.97 -0.01 0.97
Industry: Metals and Machinery -0.65 0.08 -0.65 0.08 -0.66 0.08
Industry: Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals -0.10 0.78 -0.10 0.78 -0.10 0.78
Industry: Construction -0.54 0.20 -0.54 0.20 -0.54 0.20
Industry: Wood, Pulp and Furniture -1.08 0.01 -1.08 0.01 -1.08 0.01
Industry: Non-metallic and Plastic Materials -0.16 0.68 -0.16 0.68 -0.16 0.68
Industry: Paper -0.11 0.80 -0.11 0.80 -0.11 0.80
Industry: Other Manufacturing -0.06 0.91 -0.06 0.91 -0.06 0.91
Firm's Size: Less than 10 Employees -1.32 0.00 -1.32 0.00 -1.32 0.00
Firm's Size: 10 - 50 Employees -0.34 0.11 -0.34 0.11 -0.34 0.11
Firm's Size: 50 - 100 Employees 0.11 0.66 0.11 0.66 0.11 0.66
Firm's Size: More than 250 Employees 0.28 0.35 0.28 0.35 0.28 0.35
Foreign Ownership (1 = "Yes") 0.76 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.76 0.00
Power Outages (1 = "Yes") 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09
Registry Coverage > 0 X Power Outages 0.17 0.09
Registry Coverage > 3% X Power Outages 0.22 0.05
Credit Information Index > 1 X Power Outages 0.47 0.00
Constant -0.28 0.48 -0.28 0.47 -0.28 0.48
Wald chi2(27) 263.36 0.00 263.35 0.00 272.62 0.00
Number of obs 8201 8201 8201
Dependent variable: Firm owns a generator (1 = "Yes")
39
Table 11: Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences Approach (Model 2)
Variable Coef. P-value
Country: Benin -1.21 0.00
Country: Eritrea 0.09 0.88
Country: Kenya 0.43 0.15
Country: Madagascar -2.52 0.00
Country: Malawi -1.34 0.00
Country: Mali 0.25 0.48
Country: Mauritius -1.29 0.00
Country: Senegal 0.21 0.49
Country: South Africa -2.60 0.00
Country: Uganda -0.74 0.01
Country: Zambia -1.71 0.00
Industry: Garments and Textiles -0.69 0.08
Industry: Food and Beverages -0.002 1.00
Industry: Metals and Machinery -0.77 0.06
Industry: Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals -0.09 0.81
Industry: Construction -0.41 0.36
Industry: Wood, Pulp and Furniture -1.18 0.01
Industry: Non-metallic and Plastic Materials -0.08 0.85
Industry: Paper -0.06 0.90
Industry: Other Manufacturing -0.14 0.81
Firm's Size: Less than 10 Employees -1.52 0.00
Firm's Size: 10 - 50 Employees -0.48 0.04
Firm's Size: 50 - 100 Employees 0.05 0.86
Firm's Size: More than 250 Employees 0.35 0.28
Foreign Ownership (1 = "Yes") 0.71 0.00
Year: 1991 -2.76 0.00
Year: 1992 -1.87 0.00
Year: 1993 -2.03 0.00
Year: 1994 -1.49 0.00
Year: 1995 -1.46 0.00
Year: 1996 -1.36 0.00
Year: 1997 -0.87 0.00
Year: 1998 -0.37 0.00
Year: 2000 0.36 0.00
Year: 2001 0.63 0.00
Year: 2002 0.79 0.00
Year: 2003 0.91 0.00
Year: 2004 1.29 0.00
Power Outages X Domestic Credit Growth 0.43 0.01
Constant -0.25 0.56
Wald chi2(39) 441.06 0.00
Number of obs 8166
Dependent variable: Firm owns a generator (1 = "Yes")
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Table 12: Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences Approach (Model 3)
Variable
Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Country: Benin -0.90 0.01 -0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.001 0.00
Country: Eritrea -0.24 0.62 -0.02 0.59 -0.01 0.58 -0.0004 0.58
Country: Kenya 0.19 0.42 0.02 0.44 0.01 0.45 0.0004 0.46
Country: Madagascar -1.96 0.00 -0.12 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.002 0.00
Country: Malawi -0.75 0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.001 0.01
Country: Mali 0.03 0.90 0.003 0.90 0.00 0.90 0.0001 0.90
Country: Mauritius -1.01 0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.001 0.00
Country: Senegal 0.06 0.81 0.01 0.81 0.002 0.81 0.0001 0.81
Country: South Africa -2.41 0.00 -0.13 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.002 0.00
Country: Uganda -0.71 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.001 0.00
Country: Zambia -1.66 0.00 -0.10 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.002 0.00
Industry: Garments and Textiles -0.49 0.11 -0.04 0.08 -0.01 0.07 -0.001 0.08
Industry: Food and Beverages 0.07 0.80 0.01 0.81 0.002 0.81 0.0002 0.81
Industry: Metals and Machinery -0.56 0.09 -0.05 0.05 -0.01 0.04 -0.001 0.06
Industry: Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals -0.01 0.97 -0.001 0.99 -0.0003 0.97 -0.00002 0.97
Industry: Construction -0.40 0.29 -0.03 0.23 -0.01 0.21 -0.001 0.22
Industry: Wood, Pulp and Furniture -1.03 0.00 -0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.002 0.01
Industry: Non-metallic and Plastic Materials -0.09 0.77 -0.01 0.77 -0.003 0.77 -0.0002 0.77
Industry: Paper -0.06 0.87 -0.01 0.87 -0.002 0.87 -0.0001 0.87
Industry: Other Manufacturing 0.03 0.96 0.003 0.96 0.001 0.96 0.0001 0.96
Firm's Size: Less than 10 Employees -1.28 0.00 -0.10 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.002 0.00
Firm's Size: 10 - 50 Employees -0.33 0.10 -0.03 0.09 -0.01 0.09 -0.001 0.12
Firm's Size: 50 - 100 Employees 0.07 0.75 0.01 0.76 0.002 0.76 0.0001 0.76
Firm's Size: More than 250 Employees 0.30 0.26 0.03 0.30 0.01 0.32 0.001 0.33
Foreign Ownership (1 = "Yes") 0.71 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.002 0.00
Domestic Credit Growth 0.68 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.001 0.00
mu1 1.98
mu2 4.74
Wald chi2(26) 313.30 0.00
Number of obs
Regression coeff.
8464
Marginal effect (d=1) Marginal effect (d=2) Marginal effect (d=3)
Dependent variable: Firm bought a generator at stable power supply (1 = "Yes"), Firm bought a generator during outages (2 =
"Yes"), Firm bought a generator after consecutive outages (3 = "Yes")
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